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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
BENNER J. CARLING,
Petitioner,
vs.

I N D U S T R I A L COMMISSION OF
UTAH and C O N S O L I D A T E D
WESTERN STEEL D I V I S I O N ,
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION,
Respondents

Case No.
10177

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a proceeding before the Industrial Commission
of the State of Utah for "acoustic trauma" claimed to have
been sustained by petitioner as the result of an industrial
accident in the course of his employment with respondent
Consolidated Western Steel Division of United States Steel
Corporation.
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DISPOSITION BY THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
The Industrial Commission of Utah found that the
hearing loss of Petitioner was not caused by a single incident as claimed by Petitioner and denied workmen's compensation benefits.
RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS PROCEEDING
Petitioner seeks a determination by this court that the
order of the Industrial Commission is not lawful.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Rule 75 (t) (2) amended November 15, 1955 and January 1, 1962 in sample outline of brief provides under Title
"Statement of Facts" :
"The statement should be a concise but complete statement of the material facts. They should
be stated, not merely as the appellant contends
them to be, but viewed, as they must on appeal, favorable to the verdict of the jury (or the finding of
the court)."
The "Statement of Facts" contained in Petitioner's
brief does not comply with this general admonition in that
it recites only "facts" as appellant contends them to be,
eliminating all reference to relevant controverting evidence.
For this reason, we deem it necessary to re-state the
facts as follows:
1. Petitioner's general employment

record.
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In 1941 Petitioner accepted employment as a welder
helper with Pacific States Pipe Company at Ironton, Utah.
He shortly thereafter obtained extensive vocational training in "pipe fabricating ,, and "welding" at Provo, Utah
(Ex. 11, R. 192). Having thus been trained, he obtained
employment with Midwest at Geneva, Utah as a pipe fabricator in 1942. This employment continued until he became employed as a "welder" for United States Steel Corporation in the open hearth department at Geneva (Ex.
11, R. 192). He was employed by numerous contracting
and industrial firms over the years and at the time of the
claimed incident, he was employed as a pipefitter performing steel erection work at Consolidated Western Steel Division of the United States Steel Corporation at Geneva,
Utah (R. 3, 21-23).
2. Type of work actually being performed at the time
of the claimed incident.
In the initial claim filed with the Industrial Commission, Petitioner stated (R. 2) :
"Using an air chipping gun to vibrate and pack
sand in pipe (4 inch). Noise from this caused injury."
The pipe involved was 4 inches in diameter and 21
feet long (R. 128, 135). The pipes were stood on end
against a scaffolding and sand poured in from the top to
facilitate subsequent bending of the pipe. An air hammer
was operated against each pipe as it was being filled with
sand to vibrate and compact the sand into the pipe. This
is a standard method used in the pipe bending process (R.
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123-143). Photographs demonstrating this process are
contained in Exhibit 11 at record page 191. Petitioner testified that he had been operating the air hammer against
the pipes for from 20 to 25 minutes at the time of the
claimed incident (R. 147).
3.
injury.

Employment

of petitioner subsequent to claimed

In the initial claim, Petitioner admits that he was not
required to leave work because of his claimed injury (R.
2 ) . He continued his employment with Consolidated Westtern Steel Division until July of 1962 (R. 38, 157). He
then became employed by P. & L. Company as a welder
and continued in that employment until April of 1963
when he sustained a back injury which caused his unemployment (R. 38, 158). His employment following the
claimed industrial accident continued to be "in a noisy
place" (R. 28).
4.

The claim of Petitioner.

On June 7, 1962, Petitioner filed with the Industrial
Commission of Utah his application to Settle Industrial
Accident Claim (R. 2). His claim was that on August 31,
1960, more than twenty-one months prior thereto, he sustained injury arising out of or in the course of his employment. He claims that while he was in the course of operating the air chipping gun against the pipe, the "general
noise around the place", including that made by machines
and trains, became "muffled". He testified that he then
went straight to and advised his foreman that "I have had
something happen. I can't hear" (R. 148). He then pro-
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ceeded back to the job and exchanged places with the man
on the top of the scaffold. Petititoner then poured the
sand into the pipes and his helper performed the function
of "beating the pipe" with the air hammer (R. 148).
Petitioner admitted in his discussions with examining
physician Voorhees that he had sustained some hearing loss
prior to 1945-46 and that his mother had had a hearing
problem (R. 168-9). He did not disclose these facts to his
own physician, Dr. Gray, at the time of Dr. Gray's examination although these factors might well have affected his
diagnosis, particularly in view of the lack of objective
standards and the fact that the study of hearing loss is
not "a pure science" (R. 90, 92).
5. Petitioner's hearing

problems.

The evidence demonstrating that Petitioner has sustained a hearing loss is uncontroverted. His hearing loss
had commenced many years prior to the claimed industrial
accident. Exhibit 1 (R. 163) demonstrates that Petitioner
was found to have a 9% hearing loss on August 29, 1946.
Exhibit 2 (R. 165) demonstrates that a 6.8% hearing loss
was noted on January 1, 1947 and that he had been rejected
by the "Department" on January 7, 1946. Petitioner had
been advised of his hearing loss in the 1945-46 period. It
had not been obvious to him and he was "surprised" to
discover that some loss in fact existed. He ultimately was
employed despite his hearing loss (R. 168).
No further audiograms were performed upon Petitioner until shortly after the claimed industrial accident
(R. 122). An audiogram performed on September 6, 1960
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demonstrated a 32% hearing loss (R. 20). Numerous other
audiograms were performed between that date and October 17, 1961 which generally demonstrate that Petitioner's
hearing gradually deteriorated following the claimed industrial accident (R. 6-18).
6. Effect of noise upon hearing.
Extreme noise can cause hearing loss. The following
statements appear in Exhibit 9:

"The effect of noise on hearing is a function of
both exposure time and noise intensity. As noise
intensity increases, the amount of daily exposure
a person can stand without impairing hearing must
necessarily decrease.
"The graph on page 162 gives levels in the 8 frequency bands and exposure times which should not
be exceeded if the average person is not to receive
some degree of hearing loss from long time exposure, say 25 years, to these noise levels. For noises
containing discernable discrete frequencies such as
a generator whine, the noise level values of these
curves must be reduced by approximately 10 db as
the ear is more sensitive to single tone noise than
to broad band noise.
"To illustrate use of these curves, a person
could stand on a street corner exposed to 80 db overall noise 8 hours a day, 5 days a week for 25 years
without auditory injury, but might well receive
some hearing loss from two hours' use of a pneumatic riveting gun (where noise levels may reach
100 db to 110 db in the high frequency octave
bands) repeated each working day for 25 years."
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The graph referred to at page 162 demonstrates that
the safe level is over 100 db for daily 30 minute exposures
over a 25 year period and that the maximum recommended
overall noise level for any singe exposure is 140 db (R.
189).
Dr. Larsen listed the general threshhold level at 85
db (R. 117). Dr. Voorhees in his report stated:
"Much is unknown about any safe amount of
noise exposure, but in the revised Guide For Conservation of Hearing in Noise published by the
American Academy of Opthamology and Otolaryngology in 1957, it is stated, 'if the sound energy
of the noise is distributed more or less evenly
through the eight octave bands and if a person is
to be exposed to this noise regularly for many hours
a day, five days a week for many years, then; if
the noise level in either the 300-600 cycle band or
the 600-1200 band at 85 db, the initiation of noise
exposure control and tests of hearing is advisable/ "
Dr. Gray, testifying for the Petitioner, admitted that
hearing loss due to noise usually resulted from "a more
prolonged exposure" (R. 70). He testified further that
traumatic sound in industry "is stated to be over 100 decibels, and frequently in the range of 125 decibels of sound
pressure" (R. 96).
7. Noise level and duration at the time of the claimed
industrial accident
Petitioner testified that he operated an air gun against
the pipes involved only after they had become filled with
sand. He testified that he had been engaged in this ac-
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tivity for only from 20 to 25 minutes at the time of the
claimed incident (R. 145, 147). When being interviewed
by Dr. Voorhees, he stated that he had been hammering
for from 15 to 20 minutes prior to the claimed incident (R.
167). He did not offer any evidence of any sudden or extreme noise.
Prior to the time of the hearing, the employer retained Leland K. Irvine, an admitted expert specializing
in accoustical engineering, to recreate to the extent possible the precise circumstances involved at the time of the
alleged incident and to determine noise intensity (R. 1223). The same type pipe was used and filled with sand in
a similar manner. A similar air gun then was used to
vibrate the sand in the pipes. Tests were taken to indicate
noise levels when the pipes were empty, when they were
1/3 full, when they were 1/2 full and when they were completely filled (R. 125, 126, 135). Since Petitioner admittedly operated the air hammer against the pipe only when
full, those particular readings more nearly approximate
the actual condition existing at the time of the alleged
incident (R. 145).
The sound pressure level measurements indicated
sounds well distributed in eight octave bands ranging from
20-75 to 4800-9600 frequency cycles per second. When the
pipe was full of sand, the situation which existed when
Petitioner was vibrating the pipe, all of the octave bands
were below 90 and all but two of the octave bands were 80
or below. The tests indicated that, even with the pipe
empty, a condition not experienced by Petitioner, the
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sound did not reach 110 db in any frequency cycle or octave band (R. 162). As is indicated above, these levels are
below tolerance levels for brief exposures of 15 to 25 minutes duration. For example, Dr. Gray, Petitioner's own
witness, listed tolerance levels at "over 100 decibels and
frequently in the range of 125 decibels" (R. 96).
In interpreting Mr. Irvine's report, Dr. Voorhees noted
that "it appears that the noise distribution by the type of
action in which Mr. Carling was engaged was quite diffuse
throughout the octave bands" (R. 169). As is noted above,
tolerance levels are higher under these conditions than
where fewer octave bands are present (R. 190).
8.

The medical evidence.

At the beginning of the hearing, the parties stipulated
that all medical reports would be received in evidence and
that either party would have the right, even if another
hearing was required, to cross examine any doctor rendering such reports (R. 55). However, neither party elected
to call doctors who filed medical reports for cross examination pursuant to such stipulation.
A.

Dr. Dean W. Gray.

Dr. Gray filed a medical report in which he noted that
there was no history of hearing loss prior to the alleged
injury (R. 188). Much of his testimony at the hearing is
quoted in Appellant's Brief. Despite this long quotation,
the most critical testimony was omitted; i.e. that testimony
most favorable to the finding of the commission below.
Although Dr. Gray initially testified that in his opinion
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Petitioner's loss of hearing was due to acoustic trauma,
he admitted on cross examination that Petitioner's condition may be a "chronic progressive hearing loss, referred
to frequently as presbycusis" (R. 70), that his "first and
initial thought" was that any "acoustic trauma" resulted
from a "long exposure" (R. 71), that Petioner's condition
may have resulted from a "hereditary nerve loss" (R. 91),
and that his ultimate diagnosis was based in "substantial
part" upon Petitioner's own statements (R. 85).
B.

Dr. Boyd J. Larsen:

Dr. Cornell, a physician working under the direction
of Dr. Larsen, the staff physician for the employer, could
find no physical evidence of injury, aside from Petitioner's
subjective symptoms. He, therefore, advised Petitioner that
his condition was non-industrial and that he should employ his own physician (R. 4). Dr. Ostler was suggested
to him (R. 107). His referral to Dr. Ostler was as a nonindustrial patient (R. 107). Dr. Larsen expressed his
opinion as follows (R. 114-115) :
"Q. Well, are you able to state that it could
not have been caused by the exposure to the noise
of the hammer, if Mr. Carling in fact was exposed
to such noise?
"A. I could express an opinion to this effect.
That there was one incident in which he was using
the air hammer for a relatively short period of
time, and I would not feel that this one incident has
caused his hearing condition as it is today.
"Q. And was this your opinion when he first
visited you?
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"A. Yes. For this reason he was advised to
seek his own medical care, because of previous hearing loss that our records indicated that he had."
Dr. Larsen also testified that there had been a "deterioration of his hearing" following the claimed incident
(R. 119).
C. Dr. D.E.

Ostler:

Dr. Ostler, the private physician to whom Petitioner
was referred as a non-industrial patient, stated in his
report (R. 5 ) :
"His loss, as you will note, has been mainly on
the high tones, in other words, it is a nerve deafness, which could have come from exposure to loud
noises, some toxic condition, or could be hereditary.
"My oipinion is that it is probably the result
of prolonged exposure to loud noises."
D. Report of medical panel comprised of R.
Mowatt Muirhead, Dr. James Cleary and Dr.
Bryce Fairbanks:
The report of the panel was filed on December 5, 1962
(R. 28). Objection thereto was duly filed by Petitioner.
The panel found (R. 28) :
"Patient states that in 1952 he had a hearing
test given at Geneva Steel, pre-employment, at
which time he was told that he had a high tone loss
but was employable. This might account for a preliminary loss of five to ten per cent. The panel
feels that his employment in the noisy place would
contribute to hearing loss that is on a progressive
basis, and following this injury in August, 1960, the
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hearing did not return to a serviceable level. The
panel feels that the hearing loss noted by Dr. Ostler
in October, 1960, could be considered to be the loss
that this person has suffered, namely 35.4%.
"The patient has continued to work in a noisy
place and it is noted that his hearing has continued
to fall over the year in which Dr. Ostler saw this
patient, and a hearing examination done in this
office showed a further loss to about 5 1 % as of
October, 1962."
The same medical panel made a supplemental report
under date of August 17, 1963 (R. 194) to which Petitioner
did not object.
E.

Report of Dr. Richard L. Voorhees:

In his report, Dr. Voorhees stated in part (R. 167-9) :
"I am again impressed by the marked progression of the hearing loss in both ears. This is an
interesting point, since usually hearing losses caused
by loud noise are what is characteristically defined
as acoustic trauma, happens suddenly and does not
become worse thereafter. However, this man has
shown progressive hearing loss since the date of the
first audiogram following his supposed burst of
loud noise exposure.

"I am sure that there is no way to definitely
determine the entire etiology of this man's condition, but I can't help feeling that there is something
else behind the progression of his hearing loss. One
must consider that this man's mother had hearing
loss and there may be some congenital element to
his problem. In addition to this, he has undoubtedly
some element of presbycusis. This is usually slow
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in its progression, but I suppose it could be said
that it is operating here.
<t*

*

*

"A few further thoughts on the probable nature of this hearing loss; ordinarily with noise induced hearing loss the high frequencies go first.
This is commonly known. However, to produce loss
in the lower frequencies as demonstrated by Mr.
Carling, it is usually necessary to be in a continuous loud noise atmosphere of somewhat considerable intensity for a longer period of time."
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY, CAPRICIOUSLY OR UNREASONABLY
IN DENYING WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
BENEFITS TO PETITIONER FOR AN ALLEGED INDUSTRIAL INJURY ON AUGUST
31, 1960.
The scope of review in a case such as this where a
claimant appeals from a finding of the Industrial Commission is well settled. The judicial power on review in such
cases was articulated by Justice Wolfe in the case of Woodburn V. Industrial Commission, 111 Utah 393, 181 P. 2d
209 (1947) :
"The extent of review by this court in this
type of case is: Did the Commission act without
or in excess of its powers in denying compensation
to the plaintiff? Section 42-1-78, U. C. A. 1943.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
"The test applicable to this type of case to determine whether or not the commission acted without or in excess of its powers has been clearly crystalized by previous opinion and was stated as follows in Kent V. Industrial Commission, 89 Utah
381, 57 P. 2d 724, 725: I n the case of denial of
compensation, the record must disclose that there
is material, substantial, competent, uncontradicted
evidence sufficient to make a disregard of it justify
the conclusion as a matter of law, that the Industrial Commission arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded the evidence or unreasonably refused to
believe such evidence/ In Lorange V. Industrial
Commission, 107 Utah 261, 153 P. 2d 272, 273, we
quoted with approval from Kavalinakis V. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 174, 246 P. 698, as follows: 'Unless therefore it can be said, upon the
whole record, that the Commission clearly acted
arbitrarily or capriciously in making its findings
and decisions, this court is powerless to interfere.
•• * * * It was not intended, * * * that this
court, in matters of evidence, should to any extent
substitute its judgment for the judgment of the
Commission/ "
In his brief, Petitioner contends that the uncontradicted evidence supports the proposition that the claimant
suffered an accidental injury while using an air gun in
the course of his employment resulting in a permanent partial hearing disability, citing very selective portions of the
record. To support this argument, Petitioner claims in his
brief that the only evidence on this matter is the testimony
of the Petitioner and Dr. Gray, his physician. This contention is wholly without support in the record. However,
even assuming arguendo that their testimony does make
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this point, there is considerable competent contradictory
evidence. The following evidence, including medical reports
which were admitted into evidence by the stipulation of
the parties, (R. 55) is illustrative:
A. As is demonstrated in this brief in the Statement
of Facts under heading "Noise Level and Duration at Time
of Claimed Industrial Accident", Petitioner testified that
he operated the air gun against the pipes only after they
had become filled with sand. The noise intensity generated
by this conduct was determined by an acoustical engineer
who recreated, to the extent possible, these precise conditions. The test performed by the acoustical engineer demonstrated that the sound vibrations were fairly well distributed over all 8 octave bands and that noise intensity
was well below 80 decibels in 6 of the octave bands and
below 90 decibels in the other two.
As is pointed out in the Statement of Facts in this
brief under heading "Effect of Noise Upon Hearing", such
decibel levels are well below threshhold tolerance levels for
brief exposure. Dr. Gray, Petitioner's own expert witness,
listed tolerance levels for traumatic sound in industry as
"over 100 decibels, and in the frequency range of 125 decibels of sound pressure". Such evidence demonstrates that
as a physical and a medical proposition, it is extremely
unlikely, if not wholly impossible, that the use of the air
hammer against the pipes when full of sand caused the
acoustic trauma claimed by Petitioner.
B. Dr. Boyd J. Larsen, employer's physician, testified that there was no physicial evidence of injury, aside
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from Petitioner's subjective symptoms (R. 4). Dr. Larsen
also testified that Petitioner had suffered a prior hearing
loss, that the deterioration of his hearing continued after
the claimed incident and that in his opinion the use of the
air hammer for a relatively short period of time did not
cause the acoustic trauma claimed (R. 114-15, 119).
C. Dr. D. E. Ostler, a private physician who treated
Petitioner as a non-industrial patient, stated in his report
that in his opinion Petitioner's condition "is probably the
result of prolonged exposure to loud noises" (R. 5).
D. The medical panel, R. Mowatt Muirhead, James
Cleary and Bryce Fairbanks, reported a prior hearing loss
and a continuation of hearing degeneration after the
claimed incident. In the opinion of the panel, "employment
in the noisy place would contribute to hearing loss that is
on a progressive basis" (R. 28).
E. In medical report, Dr. Richard L. Voorhees
stressed the "marked progression of hearing loss in both
ears", noted that Petitioner's "mother had a hearing loss
and there may be some congenital element to his problem",
that Petitioner "has undoubtedly some element of presbycusis * * * and that it is operating here" and that
hearing loss of the kind demonstrated by Petitioner usually
results from "a continuous loud noise atmosphere of somewhat considerable intensity for a long period of time"
(R. 194).
In addition to this contradictory evidence, there is considerable doubt as to the credibility of Petitioner's medical
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testimony as presented by Dr. Gray. It is true that Dr.
Gray initially testified that Petitioner's condition resulted
from "acoustic trauma" (R. 71). However, the following
admissions made by Dr. Gray robbed his opinion of much
of its credence:
1) Petitioner's condition could be the result of either
a "chronic progressive hearing loss, referred to frequently
as prebycusis", or to an acoustic trauma. His opinion that
the condition resulted from acoustic trauma, rather than
presbycusis, was based upon Petitioner's personal history
as related to him by Petitioner (R. 70).
2) Dr. Gray's "first and initial thought" was that
any acoustic trauma resulted from a "long exposure". He
later changed that opinion because of the statements made
to him by Petitioner (R. 71).
3) Acoustic trauma usually occurs from prolonged
exposure (R. 70-1,93).
4) The determination of the cause of hearing loss
is not a "pure science". Petitioner's condition may have
resulted from a hereditary progressive condition. Dr.
Gray's diagnosis was based in "substantial part" upon
Petitioner's statements to him (R. 85, 91, 92).
5) Noise which causes trauma in industry is usually
over 100 decibels and frequently in the range of 125 decibels (R. 96). (Note that the noise generated by operating
an air hammer against a full pipe is substantially below
those levels.) (R. 162).
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6) Petitioner had admitted to him that he had been
employed in the past "around loud noise" (R. 93).
7) If Petitioner had had a prior hearing loss and
if his mother had suffered a hearing loss, "this would introduce this possibility of having inherited a propensity
or a hereditary progressive hearing loss" (R. 90) and Petitioner's condition may have been due to a "hereditary
nerve loss" (R. 91).
Thus it is seen that once Dr. Gray was presented with
the actual facts, rather than those which claimant had alleged to be true, his opinion wavered. He admittedly relied in "substantial part" upon the history given to him by
claimant, (R. 85) which was critical in his diagnosis since
it alone led to the conclusion that there had been an abrupt
hearing loss on the date of the alleged incident.
It is respectfully submitted that inasmuch as Dr.
Gray's diagnosis is based in "substantial part" on the self
serving statements of the claimant who has a pecuniary
interest in the outcome of this case, the Commission was
justified in disregarding portions of Dr. Gray's testimony.
It has long been the rule in this state that the Commission
may refuse to believe evidence when it derives solely from
an interested witness. Smith v. Industrial Commission, 104
Utah 318, 140 P. 2d 314 (1943). Afortiori, the Commission
would be justified in disbelieving Petitioner's testimony,
and that of his doctor derived in substantial part from
claimant's statements when, in addition, such testimony is
contradicted and controverted by other competent and authoritative evidence.
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Not only is the testimony of Dr. Gray put in question
by virtue of his reliance upon statements of claimant, but
similarly the statements of the claimant himself are subject to serious questions of credibility. The trier of fact
has the prerogative of judging credibility of the witnesses
and the weight to be given the evidence. Page V. Federal
Security Insurance Company, 8 U. 2d 226, 332 P. 2d 666
(1958). In the case at bar the Commission has exercised
that prerogative properly since the claimant's testimony
may well be jaundiced by bias, prejudice and self-interest
and since, contrary to the allegations of Petitioner in his
brief, there is substantial, competent contradictory evidence.
The Commission might properly have questioned the
claimant's credibility in light of the fact that claimant misstated his health history to Dr. Gray. When Dr. Gray asked
him if he had had previous hearing loss, he replied that
he had not (R. 84). This statement proved to be contrary
to the truth and is thus an indication of the veracity of the
claimant's other statements. (See Exhibits 1 and 2, R. 1634, indicating prior hearing loss and Petitioner's admission
to Dr. Voorhees that he was aware of the prior hearing
lossR. 168).
Even assuming for purposes of argument that Petitioner was conscious of a marked change in his hearing on
the day in question, this fact, standing alone, certainly
would not have supported a finding by the Commission of
the occurrence of an industrial accident. We have searched
the record in vain for any evidence that the decibel level
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of the noise at the time of the claimed hearing loss was of
sufficient intensity and duration to have caused traumatic
injury. Construing the evidence most favorably to Petitioner, at best, there would be a showing only that a hearing loss occurred on the job without any evidence whatsoever that noise, or any other employment related factor,
caused such loss. This complete failure of proof upon the
necessary element of causation apparently prompted the
following comment by the referee during the course of the
hearing (R. 114) :
"I might point out, gentlemen, that the Commission still has to determine — before we pay any
attention to any of this testimony — whether there
actually was excessive exposure to noise. We
haven't determined that yet. The panel has no authority to make that kind of a decision. That is
for the Commission, so the panel report always
assumes, but not decides."
No evidence of "excessive exposure to noise" was presented at the hearing. The only evidence on this subject
indicated affirmatively that there was no "excessive exposure to noise". Under these circumstances, and since
Petitioner makes no claim of occupational disease (R. 2,
59). Petitioner failed to meet the following test recently enunciated by this court in Pintar v. The Industrial
Commission of the State of Utah, et al, 14 Utah 2d 276,
382 P. 2d 414 (1963):
"It is therefore a prerequisite to compensation
that his disability be shown to result not as a gradual development because of the nature or conditions
of his work, but from an identifiable accident or
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accidents in the course of his employment. There
being substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding to the contrary, no basis exists upon
which this court could rule that its denial of compensation was capricious or arbitrary."
In Purity Biscuit Company V. Industrial Commission,
115 Utah 1, 201 P. 2d 961 (1949), relied upon by Petitioner
in his Petition for Rehearing (R. 207) and in his brief
(brief 25) this court in opinion by Justice Wade quoted
with approval the following language of Mr. Chief Justice
Wolfe in Dee Memorial Hospital Association v. Industrial
Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P. 2d 233 (1943) :
«* * * j conclude that it is necessary that
the claimant establish some connection between the
injury and the employment before compensation
will be allowed. The mere fact that the employee becomes ill on the premises of the employer will not
suffice. The employer should not be charged with
internal failures not contributed to nor caused by
the employment nor occurring in pursuit thereof
nor in any way employment-connected. * * *"
In Tedesco V. Industrial Commission, 86 Utah 501, 46
P. 2d 670 (1935), a decedent suffered "peritonitis" due to
a perforated ulcer. He was a strong, healthy athletic man,
34 years old, had had no physical disability and had manifest no distress after eating nor complained of stomach
trouble. While working in a powder magazine, he attempted
to lift a 50 pound case of powder which had been stuck to
the floor. In jerking it loose, he was stricken by a severe
pain in the abdomen. He reported this experience to fellow
employees and obtained medical treatment, but died some
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time later. In sustaining a denial of workmen's compensation benefits, this court stated:
"For applicant to establish a case it was necessary to show a causal connection between the alleged accident and the resulting injury, if any, and
the duodenal ulcer, its perforation of the bowel,
and the resulting peritonitis. The record fails to
disclose any causal connection between the alleged
accidental injury and the peritonitis causing death.
To certain hypothetical questions, assuming some
matters not in evidence, whereby it was attempted
to show that there was a connection between a
strangulated hernia and the perforated duodenal
ulcer, the answer was that 'it was possible', while
it was also stated that no such connection was found
to exist. There is no direct evidence in the record
that the alleged injury caused a hernia. There is no
evidence in the record, if it be inferred that such
hernia existed, that there was any connection between such hernia and the duodenal ulcer, its perforation of the duodenum, or the death of deceased.
"The ultimate and controlling findings of the
Commission are in harmony with the competent
evidence submitted. No cause for disturbing the
findings of the Commission is shown. The order
denying compensation is therefore affirmed."
Similarly, here the record fails to disclose any causal
connection between the alleged accidental injury and the
hearing loss sustained. On the contrary, the competent evidence set forth above demonstrates affirmatively that no
causal connection existed.
The record in this case may be summarized briefly as
follows:
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A. The evidence as to whdther or not Petitioner sustained an abrupt hearing loss i^ in conflict. The only evidence indicating an abrupt heaifing loss was derived from
the person with a pecuniary interest in the case.
B. The evidence relating tp the cause of the hearing
loss is in conflict.
C. The record contains nb evidence whatsoever of
any "excessive exposure to noiie". On the contrary, the
evidence on this subject demonstrates that the noise level
was well under limits of safety.
We submit that the record clearly demonstrates the
propriety of the order of the Commission denying benefits
to Petitioner, that in so doing, the Commission did not act
arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably and that its order
should be affirmed by this court.
POINT
THE COMMISSION DID rtOT ERR BY "PREVENTING OR DISSUADING" PETITIONER
FROM INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE.
In Point II of Petitioner's irief (brief pages 21, 22)
he suggests that Petitioner was dissuaded at the hearing
from producing supplemental evidence corroborating Petitioner's testimony that he observed a difference in his hearing immediately following the claimed industrial accident.
Petitioner cites record pages 71 pud 72 in support of this
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claim. We fail to find anything at those pages of the transcript, or at any other place, supporting this claim. Petitioner may have had reference to the colloquy between the
referee and counsel for Petitioner relating to the sound
studies made by the acoustical engineer at record pages
119, 120, 121, 122 and 131. The record there demonstrates
that counsel for Petitioner was objecting to introduction
into evidence of the sound studies performed by the acoustical engineer. Counsel for Petitioner offered to call additional witnesses to demonstrate the marked change in hearing of the claimant. After some discussion, the referee
concluded, "I don't think I need anything like that" (R.
121). Counsel for Petitioner then responded "All right.
I'll accept the Commissioner's statement" (R. 121). The
colloquy with respect to the same evidence was resumed
at record page 131. There counsel for Petitioner renewed
his objections stating: "I am trying to — of course they
have got tests here, which I think are completely unreliable. It is my duty to —."
The referee responded: "Then you can put on your
witnesses" (R. 131).
The general rule applicable where a claim is made on
appeal that the trier of the facts erroneously excluded evidence is stated in 4A C. J. S., Appeal and Error, Section
712 at page 551 as follows:
"To present an alleged error in the exclusion of
evidence, the record must show that it was offered
and excluded, the purpose for which it was offered,
that it was material and relevant, the ground urged
against its admission in the absence of a showing
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that only a general objection was made, the grounds
of objection to its exclusion, and the grounds on
which it was excluded;"
We submit that none of these tests are satisfied. Petitioner offered no evidence, despite the fact that he was
invited to do so by the Commission (R. 131). No evidence
was excluded by the Commission. No objection was made
by Petitioner to any exclusion which he assumed. On the
contrary, Petitioner acquiesced in any assumed exclusion
of evidence by saying "All right. I'll accept the Commissioner's statement" (R. 121) and by failing to accept the
invitation of the referee to "put on witnesses" (R. 131).
In addition, even assuming arguendo that the Commission had excluded additional evidence duly and properly
offered which would corroborate Petitioner's claim of sudden hearing loss, such exclusion would not be prejudicial
upon the record of this case. The basis for the decision
below was that Petitioner had failed to prove that an incident during his employment had caused his hearing loss
(R. 200-201). Thus, the basic deficiency in Petitioner's
case was his failure to show a causal relationship between
the incident claimed to have occurred and the hearing loss
which developed. As perceived by the Commission, such a
causal relationship is a vital prerequisite to recover under
the Workmen's Compensation laws of the State of Utah.
See Purity Biscuit Company v. Industrial Commission, 115
Utah 1, 201 P. 2d 961 (1949); Tedesco V. Industrial Commission, 86 Utah 501, 46 P. 2d 670 (1935).
It is respectfully submitted that the Commission did
IMV( in any way prevent or dissuade the Petitioner from
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introducing evidence, but, as found by the Commission (R.
200) that ''there is no competent evidence in the record to
support the single incident as the cause of hearing loss",
and that the order of the Commission should be affirmed.
POINT III.
EVEN THOUGH A HEARING DISABILITY
MIGHT BE A COMPENSABLE TYPE OF ACCIDENTAL INJURY PURSUANT TO TITLE
35, CHAPTER 1 OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, THE FACTS OF
THIS CASE DO NOT ESTABLISH AN ACCIDENTAL INJURY.
The Industrial Commission found that "There is no
competent evidence in the record to support the single incident as the cause of hearing loss" (R. 200).
The statute provides that "* * * The findings
and conclusions of the Commission on questions of fact
shall be conclusive and final and shall not be subject to
review; * * *." 35-1-85 U. C. A. 1953.
This court has on numerous occasions interpreted this
statute and held that if there is competent evidence of substantial character to sustain the findings of the Commission, they will not be disturbed. One of the more recent
decisions of the court so holding is that of Edlund V. Industrial Commission, 122 Utah 238, 248 P. 2d 365 (1952).
We have heretofore set forth herein the evidence upon
which the above finding was made and respectfully submit
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that it is competent and of substantial character and that
the finding should not be disturbed.
CONCLUSION
We submit that the evidence in the record relating to
an industrial accident is in substantial controversy, that
the record contains no evidence whatsoever of any causal
connection between the Petitioner's hearing loss and any
phase of his employment with Respondent, that the order
of the Commission denying workmen's compensation benefits to the Petitioner is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable and that it should be affirmed by this court.
Respectfully submitted,
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